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Abstract
This paper tests for market power on the market for biofuels, employing a
statistical model and making use of the idea of Granger causality. We use a panel
data set of plant speciﬁc input prices and quantities of wood chip covering 91
Swedish district heating plants 1990-1996. If quantity Granger causes price, it is
taken as an indication of market power. We ﬁnd that the Swedish district heating
plants to some degree have market power in the market for wood chips.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The objective of this paper is to test for market power on the market for
biofuels used as an input in Swedish heating plants. To achieve our objective
we employ a statistical model and make use of the idea of Granger causality.
We use a panel data set covering 91 Swedish district heating plants for the
period 1990 to 1996.
District heating and the use of biofuels are important parts of the Swedish
policy to reduce the use of non-renewable resources, and in the long run, to
phase out nuclear power in the production of heat and electricity. According
to L¨ onner et al. (1998), there is a signiﬁcant potential for increasing the use
of wood fuel in Sweden, at a fairly moderate cost. Three reasons to why
this potential is not realized is given by Br¨ annlund et al. (2004). The ﬁrst
reason concerns the fact that domestically produced wood fuel may be too
expensive relative to other fuels, due to signiﬁcant costs of production and/or
distribution. The second reason is possible market imperfections such as
monopsony/oligopsony, and the third reason relates to the fact that potential
buyers of wood fuel refrain from increasing its use due to uncertainty about
future taxes and technical uncertainty.
In this paper we focus on the second explanation and investigate if the
market for wood chips is characterized by imperfect competition. Although
district heating and the use of biofuels are important parts of the Swedish
policy to reduce the use of non-renewable resources, investigations of pos-
sible market power in the district heating sector is, to our knowledge, rare.
Br¨ annlund et al. (2004) estimate the shadow price of wood fuel, i.e., the
marginal valuation of wood fuel, and compare this to the observed average
market price. They argue that a signiﬁcant positive diﬀerence between the
shadow price and the observed price would imply market power. This paper
addresses essentially the same problem as Br¨ annlund et al (2004), but the
data set in this paper contains ﬁrm speciﬁc input prices and the model is
diﬀerent.
At least two underlying facts provide logical sense for the market for wood
chips to be considered as several local monopsonies. The transportation of2 Biofuels and Market Power...
wood chips is costly and may cause market friction. Even if long transports
of wood chips by train in some cases occur, are they of course limited by
the rail road network. Another reason for limited competition is too few
potential buyers of wood chips. Besides fuel input in the district heating
sector, wood chips are used in the pulp and chipboard industries. The
production of these products is concentrated to a few major plants, mostly
located at the eastern coast line of Sweden. Although the district heating
plants are not as sparsely distributed as the pulp and paper plants and the
chipboard plants, the transportation costs, at least to some extent, rule out
competition for wood chips between diﬀerent district heating plants.
To test the hypothesis of market power in the Swedish wood chips market
we use the Granger causality methodology, introduced by Granger (1969).
Av a r i a b l eq is said to Granger cause variable p if the prediction of p,b a s e d
on its past history can be improved by incorporating the history of q.I fa
market is characterized by full competition, variations in the quantity of a
ﬁrm’s input factor, q,w i l lh a v en oe ﬀect on the price, p,o ft h a ti n p u t .I f ,o n
the other hand, the ﬁrm can aﬀect its input price by varying input quantity,
the ﬁrm is said to have market power. This makes it possible to use Granger
causality as an indicator of market power, as suggested by Br¨ annlund et al.
(1999).
Granger causality tests have been used in several papers and the main
part concerns the relation between diﬀerent economic activities and eco-
nomic growth. For example, Choe (2003) investigates if foreign direct in-
vestment and gross domestic investment promote economic growth, Atuk-
eren (1994) tests the relation between exports and economic growth, and
Chen (1993) focuses on the relation between defence spending and economic
growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the district heating sector and the market for wood chips. In section 3 we
specify the model and the technique for testing market power. Section 4
presents the data and the estimation results. Finally, section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.Biofuels and Market Power... 3
2 District heating and the market for wood chips
D i s t r i c th e a t i n gw a si n t r o d u c e di nS w e d e ni n1 9 4 8 . T h em a i ne x p a n s i o n
occurred in the period between 1975-1985, mainly as a reaction to the oil
crises of 1973 and 1979. At that time, Sweden was to a large extent depen-
dent on oil both for district heating plants and for oil boilers in small houses
and apartment blocks. During the most recent decades the use of oil boilers
has decreased, and as a result the use of oil as an input in district heating
plants has also decreased. In 1970 the district heating sector produced 15
TWh and in 2001 the production was 46,6 TWh. According to the Swedish
district heating association the annual growth in the production of district
heating will be 2-3 percent until 2010, and the long run production poten-
tial is estimated to be 80 TWh, which is about 75 percent of the market
for heating today.1 The future production potential in the district heating
sector is, according to the Swedish district heating association, mainly put
into action by building small scale district heating2, extend the use of waste
heat, and by eﬃciency gains from connecting diﬀerent district heating pipes
and from increased joint production of heat and electricity3.
In 1998 almost 1 700 000 apartments and 130 000 small houses used
district heating. Naturally, district heating mainly occurs in the bigger cities
since the ﬁx e dc o s tf o rt h ep i p e l i n e sa n dt h ep o w e rp l a n tc a nb es h a r e db y
more consumers. In Sweden there are 107 cities with more than 10 000
1According to Statistics Sweden the total market for heating is 106 TWh in 2001. If
the population does not grow faster than today, the Swedish district heating association
suggests that the total need for heating actually may decrease due to eﬃciency gains and
warmer climate.
2Small scale district heating is a smaller power plant and a local system of pipes for
distributing the heat.
3According to the Swedish district heating association, the use of combined power and
heating plants in Sweden is small, while 75 percent of the district heating in Finland and
Denmark is produced in combined power and heat plants. By connecting the pipes from
district heating in nearby cities the eﬃency can be increased. For example both Link¨ oping
and Mj¨ olby have district heating plants but the cities are connected with a 30 kilometer
pipe which makes it possible for both cities to use the the cheap waste based heat during
t h es u m m e r ,w h i c hi sp r o d u c e di nac o m b i n e dp o w e ra n dh e a tp l a n ti nL i n k ¨ oping.4 Biofuels and Market Power...
inhabitants, and all of these cities are to some extent heated by district
heating. Only 18 percent of the smaller cities with 200 to 3 000 inhabitants
are partly heated by district heating. Today a typical city in Sweden with
district heating is powered by 2-3 boilers for diﬀerent fuels. In some cases
several heating plants are connected in a district heating system. In some
plants the production of heat is combined with production of electrical power
and district cooling.
Traditionally the district heating sector has been considered as a natural
monopoly, as only one ﬁrm provides the system of pipes for distributing the
heat on a local market, typically the same ﬁrm producing the heat. There
is an ongoing debate regarding the possibility for more than one ﬁrm to be
connected to the system of pipes for distributing the heat.4 In the Nordic
countries, only Copenhagen, has competition between ﬁrms in a district
heating system.5 Although the district heating sector can be considered as
a natural monopoly on the output market, the situation is diﬀerent in the
input market. Diﬀerent inputs in the district heating sector have diﬀerent
alternative uses. For the case of oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity it is
reasonable to assume that district heating power plants are price takers as
these factors are traded on a global market in which the district heating
plants are small buyers. Apart from the above mentioned inputs, district
heating plants use various kinds of biofuels. The most important being
various kind of wood fuels, such as residues from the sawmill industry, and
logging residues from forestry. In contrast to other fuel inputs, such as oil,
it is not as obvious that the district heating plants are price takers in the
market for wood chips. This is, as mentioned before, motivated by the fact
that the transportation of wood chips is costly6 in combination with the
4Besides the economic aspect of a deregulation of the district heating market, some
technical aspects have to be solved such as who is to be responsible for the pressure level
and the temperature level at diﬀerent nodes in a system of pipes which is used by several
ﬁrms.
5The ﬁrm VEK in Copenhagen buys heat from several diﬀerent plants and then dis-
tributes and sells the heat to the consumers.
6Although transportation of wood chips generally is costly the combined power and
heat plant in V¨ aster˚ as (Sweden) use wood chips which is transported over 600 kilometersBiofuels and Market Power... 5
absence of many potential users of wood chips on the local market. This
suggests that the district heating plants might have market power, at least
locally, in this particular market.
3 Methodology for testing market power
Since the introduction of the ”new empirical industrial organization”, market
power has frequently been tested within structural models. Typically, the
conduct of a ﬁrm or an industry is treated as unknown parameters to be
estimated jointly with cost and demand parameters. The determination of
price and quantity is based on behavioral equations which are linked to,
for instance, the theory of oligopoly, see for instance Appelbaum (1982),
Bresnahan (1981), Porter (1983), and Roberts (1984). A survey of empirical
papers in this area can be found in Bresnahan (1989). A large number of the
empirical market power papers concern monopoly and oligopoly. Examples
of studies of market power in input markets are Atkinson and Kerkvliet
(1989), and Bergman and Br¨ annlund (1995). An alternative approach is
put forward by Br¨ annlund et al. (1999). They use VAR and the Granger
causality approach on Swedish price and quantity data for various paper
products to test what they label ”the small open economy hypothesis”. The
line of argument is that if quantities do not contribute to the explanation
of future prices, the small open economy hypothesis for the Swedish forest
sector is supported.
In this paper we follow the latter method and use Granger causality
to test for market power. One advantage with this approach is that no
restrictive assumptions concerning demand, costs, and market behavior are
needed, which is the case when a structural model is used. If a market
on rail road from Lycksele (Sweden). To make this transportation proﬁtable M¨ alarenergi
had to build rail road tracks to the plant and guarantee to buy all wood chips from the
same supplier. In addition the company Green Cargo had to invest in new train sets.
The nearby city Eskilstuna also tried to use rail road transported wood chips but this
turned out to be unproﬁtable as the wood chips had to be reloaded and transported by
truck between the rail road station and the power plant.6 Biofuels and Market Power...
is characterized by perfect competition the ﬁrms are price takers. More
speciﬁcally, if a ﬁrm changes its use of an input factor, the price of that
factor will essentially remain unchanged. On the other hand, if a ﬁrm can
systematically aﬀect the price of an input factor by altering the input level,
it suggests that the ﬁrm to some extent has market power. In this paper,
we test the presence of Granger causality between the use of wood chips as
an input, at the ﬁrm level, and the corresponding ﬁrm speciﬁc price of wood
chips. If we ﬁnd that quantity Granger cause price, we will treat this as an
i n d i c a t o ro fm a r k e tp o w e r .
To perform the Granger causality test, we follow Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988) and specify time-series relations, for the price of wood chips and
the quantity of wood chips:






βlqit−l + ei + uit (1)






δlpit−l + fi + vit (2)
where pit is the ﬁrm speciﬁc wood chips price for ﬁrm i in period t, and qit
is the same ﬁrm’s input of wood chips. The αl,βl,γl, and δl are unknown
parameters to be estimated. The ei and fi are ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀects. The lag
length, m, is assumed to be long enough to ensure white noise in the error
terms uit and vit. We simplify the model by using the same number of lags for
each right hand side variable. The quantity is said to Granger cause the price
if predictions of the price, based on its history, improve by incorporating
the quantity. Granger causality is present if H0: β1 = β2 = ... = βm =0i s
rejected. To perform the Granger causality test and investigate the presence
of market power, we only need to estimate the price equations, as we use
the βl parameters to test whether quantity causes price or not. However, by
estimating the price and quantity equations jointly, we may gain eﬃciency
as in any other estimation procedure based on a system of equations.
The introduction of ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀects in a panel model with lagged
dependent variables cause a problem with correlation between the lagged
dependent variables and the disturbances. This problem arises in both aBiofuels and Market Power... 7
ﬁxed- and random-eﬀects setting. To avoid this problem, we take the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of eqs 1 - 2 and hence eliminate ei and fi.
pit − pit−1 =
m X
l=1
αl (pit−l − pit−l−1)+
m X
l=1
βl (qit−l − qit−l−1)+uit − uit−1 (3)
qit − qit−1 =
m X
l=1
γl (qit−l − qit−l−1)+
m X
l=1
δl (pit−l − pit−l−1)+vit − vit−1, (4)
The system of eqs 3 - 4 is estimated using an instrumental variable ap-
proach to avoid correlation between the dependent variables and the error
terms. To obtain a suﬃcient number of instrumental variables for identi-
ﬁcation, the instrumental variables change for each time period. The lag
length, m, is restricted by the need for instrument variables. There are
2m parameters to be estimated in each equation, which implies a need for
at least 2m instrumental variables for each time period for identiﬁcation.
To satisfy the orthogonality conditions, 2(t − 2) instrumental variables are
available for each time period. It follows that t ≥ m +2 , to ensure at least
as many instrumental variables as parameters to be estimated.
As the qualitative outcome of our test of market power will depend on
the signiﬁcance level of the estimates and as the choice of instruments may
eﬀect the eﬃciency of the parameters we use two diﬀerent instrument sets.
Instrument set 1 is the minimum number of instruments required to identify
the parameters and instrument set 2 is of the Arellano and Bond (1991) type
with additional instruments for the early periods. To obtain some diﬀerence
between the instrument sets we assume that the maximum lag length, m,i s
2. In addition, we assume stationarity in the ﬁrst diﬀerences of all variables.
The estimation procedure is performed in the following manner. Initially
we determine the optimal lag length and in the second step we estimate the
restricted and the unrestricted model conditional on the result from the
ﬁrst step. The optimal lag length is determined by estimating the price and
quantity equations with lag length m =2a n dm = 1. The latter will be
treated as a restriction of the former and tested by a Wald test. In the8 Biofuels and Market Power...
second step we impose the restriction that the quantity parameters in the
price equations are zero, βl =0 . In the second step we will also impose the
restriction that price parameters are zero in the quantity equation, δl =0 .
The former will be our test of market power, that is, does quantity contribute
signiﬁcantly to a regression of price on its own history? If this is the case,
quantity can be said to Granger cause price, which we will treat as a sign of
market power. The latter is to test if price Granger causes quantity.
4 Data and results
Our data set is a panel of all 252 Swedish district heating power plants,
covering the period between 1990 and 1996. The data are provided by
Statistics Sweden. Unfortunately the data set is unbalanced. Only 43 of the
252 plants use wood chips as an input during all the 7 years in the sample,
and 114 of the plants do not use wood chips at all during the sample period.
In this paper our sub sample contains the plants that used wood fuel as an
input during at least 4 years.
The data set contains information on every plant’s use of wood chips
and the corresponding cost for buying it. This makes it possible for us to
calculate ﬁrm speciﬁc input prices for wood chips. In Table 1 below we
present descriptive statistics for the price of wood chips and the quantity for
the period 1990 to 1996. The average real price of wood chips is rather stable
during the period, while the average use of wood chips has almost doubled.
One interesting fact is that the standard deviation for the mean price is quite
large, indicating a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the input price among the
plants. The mean of real prices of wood chips over time and plants is 116
SEK/MWh.
The system of equations is estimated using GMM. The parameter esti-
mates for the model with lag length m = 2 are given in Table 2. As can
be seen the eﬃciency of the estimates has increased, as anticipated when
additional instruments are used.
In the following we will use the parameter estimates based on instrument
set 2. The qualitative result concerning market power is however the same forBiofuels and Market Power... 9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (across plants)
Year Prices in SEK/MWh Quantities in GWh
Mean Stdv Mean Stdv
1990 117 35.0 48.4 76.4
1991 128 49.2 58.6 95.4
1992 119 29.3 65.0 98.6
1993 115 30.6 69.2 102.5
1994 108 32.0 78.3 124.5
1995 112 35.5 73.2 114.7
1996 115 30.7 81.4 138.0
Table 2: Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses)
Instrument set 1 Instrument set 2
Variable Price eq. Quantity eq. Price eq. Quantity eq.
∆pt−1 -0.160 0.213 -0.163 0.170
(0.005) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
∆pt−2 -0.090 -0.014 -0.016 -0.037
(0.373) (0.558) (0.426) (0.006)
∆qt−1 0.101 -0.071 0.006 -0.390
(0.127) (0.688) (0.991) (<0.001)
∆qt−2 -0.204 0.341 -0.128 0.294
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Test of overidentyﬁng restrictions for instrument set 1: 30.41 (0.016)
Test of overidentyﬁng restrictions for instrument set 2: 36.6 (0.128)10 Biofuels and Market Power...
Table 3: Test of parameter restrictions (p-values in parentheses)
Type of test χ2 value Rejection
Lag length m = 2 115.6 (<0.001) NO
Granger causality q → p 71.9 (<0.001) NO
Granger causality p → q 45.5 (<0.001) NO
the estimates based on instrument set 1, although the test of overidentifying
restrictions are rejected when instrument set 1 is used. The signs of the
signiﬁcant estimates should be interpreted with care. The reason to this is
that the eﬀect on price and quantity is the result of changes emerging from
both the demand and supply side. To interpret the signs and magnitudes of
the parameter estimates we would then need a structural model in order to
identify shifts in both demand and supply. However, since the basic idea here
is to avoid structural modelling, we refrain from any interpretation of the
magnitudes of the parameters, and instead focus on statistical signiﬁcance.
In the test procedure we ﬁrst impose the restriction that all parameters
corresponding to the second lag is zero, which means that the model will
have lag length m = 1. To test this, and the following restrictions we use
an ordinary Wald test. As can be seen from Table 3 below, the hypothesis
of lag length m = 1 is rejected and in the following we will use the model
with lag length m = 2. The second step concerns market power and hence
the Granger causality between quantity and price. In this test we impose
the restriction that the parameters corresponding to lagged quantities in
the price equation jointly are zero, that is β1 = β2 =0 . According to our
test this restriction is rejected and hence we can not reject Granger causality
between quantity and price. In the last step we check if price Granger causes
quantity. This is done by testing if the parameters corresponding to lagged
prices are jointly zero in the quantity equations, that is δ1 = δ2 =0 . A l s o
this restriction is rejected which implies that price Granger causes quantity.Biofuels and Market Power... 11
5 Concluding comments
In this paper we have used the concept of Granger causality to investi-
gate possible market power in the Swedish district heating input market of
wood chips. According to our ﬁndings the history of quantities is important
when explaining the price by its own history, that is, the quantity of wood
chips Granger cause the price of wood chips. This result indicates that the
Swedish district heating sector may have market power in the market for
wood chips. The district heating power plants may have local monopsony
due to the combination of signiﬁcant transportation cost of wood chips and
few or no competing users of wood chips in the local market. For short dis-
tance transports of wood chips ordinary trucks are used. For long distance
transportation this is too expensive and special sets of trains is used. The
use of rail road transportation may imply two reloads of wood chips (from
truck to train and from train to truck) which, of course, may be expensive.
As a consequence it is reasonable to assume that the transportation cost of
wood chips will dampen the competition between potential users that are
not located in the same area. However, as pulp and paper and chipboard is
produced at few major plants, and in most cases far from a district heating
plant, the competition over wood chips in the local market is small. In the
future, competition in the local market may increase as the use of district
heating increase in combination with an increase in the use of wood chips as
an input in the district heating sector. In addition, the use of wood chips in
the production of ethanol used in cars may lead to more intense competition.
The hypothesis that the Swedish market for wood chips can be considered
as a local monopsony is also supported in Br¨ annlund et al. (2004). In
addition, they conclude that the market power seems to have decreased over
time. Unfortunately our analysis can not capture the degree of market power
and as a consequence our results can neither reject nor support decreasing
m a r k e tp o w e ro v e rt i m e .
One shortcoming with this paper is the fact that we have no information
in this data set about the diﬀerent plants’ location. Such information would
make it possible to investigate possible market power for diﬀerent plant12 Biofuels and Market Power...
clusters.
Interesting extensions to this paper would be to investigate at least three
issues: (1) Is market power present in this particular market all over Swe-
den? A few more observations for every plant in combination with informa-
tion about the plants’ location would make it possible to investigate possible
market power for geographical subgroups. (2) What is the source to market
power in this particular market? (3) What is the relation between the struc-
ture of the market and the fact that 110 of the 252 plants did not use wood
chips at all during the sample period. In addition, it would be interesting to
investigate why 95 of the plants entered the market for wood chips during
only some of the years in the sample.
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